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In responding to David Engel's Article, this Comment analyzes how
Engel situates contemporary perspectives on rights drawing from his
research in Thailand. Engel shows how the discourse of rights carries
with it meanings that have multiple and changing connotations and on-
the-ground effects. Following on Engel's questions about how
consciousness of rights spreads and takes shape in local contexts, this
Comment calls for expanding the substantive and methodological bases
for understanding the changing effects of rights discourses. This
Comment suggests that a study of the broader social and political
implications, including the costs, of rights discourses (internationally,
nationally, and locally) permits greater substantive awareness of the
changing social and political landscapes. This can only be done with the
kind of on-the-ground longitudinal study that Engel has conducted.
INTRODUCTION: A MODEST INQUIRY
David Engel's thoughtful Article asks a modest question: Why do
the ordinary people of Chiangmai, a province in northern Thailand, not
use "rights talk"?
To answer this question, Engel leads us through the trajectory of
Thailand's embrace of liberal rights from the end of the eighteenth
century onward. Although still a kingdom, Thailand's constitution and
formal legal codes suggest that the government has endowed its citizens
with some rights. Yet, despite the positive rights afforded them,
ordinary people have not embraced the language of rights in all matters.
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It is through a discussion of the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child (CRC) that Engel engages with the meaning of
rights consciousness. Trying to make sense of the deteriorating state of
a poster depicting the rights of the child, Engel muses over whether the
poor state of the poster is a metaphor for the state of rights in
Chiangmai. Against the backdrop of a rich history of and engagement
with liberal state building and rights consciousness, it seems odd that
such a prominent symbol of the international rights of children would be
left in such shambles. But given the recent uptick of the post-coup
government, it is possible that there is something more than what
meets the eye. What does the state of the poster say about the state of
rights?
Engel then provides a vivid portrayal of the history and social
landscape of rights consciousness in a village in Thailand's Chiangmai
province. His focus is on personal injury because it is a subject matter
that does not predetermine a legalistic or rights-based discourse. Engel
situates contemporary perspectives on rights while raising a number of
questions about how consciousness about rights spreads and becomes
embedded in local contexts, signifying a specific kind of engagement
with the state, the self, and conflict resolution. Once this engagement
with rights is understood within the particularities of its context, rights
consciousness emerges as something different and contingent as it is
enmeshed in, and then refracted through local cultural ethics, signifiers,
and processes.
Engel's Article makes a further point. The question he poses is not
only a substantive one; it is also methodological. Engel reflects on the
methods that researchers employ to best capture, understand, and
explain the cultural life of rights in a context where it appears that
despite acceding to international treaties on human rights, like the
CRC, rights talk is not part of the discourse of everyday life among
ordinary people.
From the standpoint of the scholar-researcher, vertical and
horizontal perspectives on rights consciousness offer two seemingly
distinct methodological approaches for understanding and
communicating to the scholarly community how we assess and evaluate
others' appreciation for the liberal values of which rights are a part.
Engel characterizes the vertical and horizontal approaches along with
their limitations. The vertical approach attempts to account for "the
transnational flow of liberal legal norms, institutions, and practices" at
local levels.1 One of the main limitations of the vertical perspective,
1. David M. Engel, Vertical and Horizontal Perspectives on Rights Consciousness, 19
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 423, 433-35 (2012).
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Engel notes, is that it.assumes an increase in the role of law in such
societies and a sort of passive acceptance of the new framework without
attention to nuance, whether it is the embrace or rejection of the
transnational legal order. 2  The horizontal approach to rights
consciousness would help address some of the shortcomings of the
vertical approach by measuring whether, and to what extent,
individuals and groups in local contexts have actually integrated or
otherwise adopted rights-based practices-whether they have attained a
rights-based "subjectivity."3
Throughout, Engel's Article shows that these discourses about
rights are not growing out of a vacuum nor are they neutral, universal
signifiers. Instead, we learn about the effects of rights consciousness
and what it means as it is woven through the fabric of a local Thai
village. The discourse of rights carries with it meanings that have
multiple, perhaps even shifting, connotations, and on-the-ground
effects.
I. INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS DISCOURSE AND STATE/HEGEMONY-BUILDING
The CRC provides an important point of departure for this
discussion. It is one of the most recent legal documents to be ratified by
the Thai government. As an international convention, the CRC permits
outside assessments by the international community of a nation-state-
a limit on sovereignty, to be sure.
The CRC requires certain behavior, permits an international
committee to observe and evaluate, and compels action on the part of
states in their adherence to international standards.4 There is,
moreover, a hegemonic component to entering into the "community" of
nation-states and ratifying U.N. treaty documents. What is the role of
transnational players in the local context?
Here, it is not solely the question of consciousness that concerns us,
but something deeper, which I think Engel's Article subtly raises.
Treaties like the CRC call for the legitimation of a certain form of
2. Id. at 435.
3. See id. at 445; Sally E. Merry, Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism:
Mapping the Middle, 108 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 38 (2006).
4. U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). UN General Assembly
Document AIRES/44/25. The Convention on the Rights of the Child requires all parties to
the treaty to observe the rights of children as set forth in its forty-five articles. The CRC
compels state parties to protect children, to create the conditions for their security and
welfare, and to act with attention to their best interests in all domains of life. Articles 43
and 44 set forth the reporting and enforcement mechanisms to which state parties bind
themselves. These include submitting bi-annual reports to the Committee on the Rights of
the Child and permitting relevant U.N. agencies to offer to participate in implementation.
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personhood-the atomized citizen who is endowed with rights. Through
the lessons of international conventions, we know that those rights
entail negative freedoms, or rights to be free from certain kinds of
treatment by states, as well as positive freedoms, or rights to certain
protections and entitlements. These rights-based conventions further
entrench the state as the organizational beacon for all societies.
Critiques of rights abound, from materialists, legal realists, and
theorists of social mobilization. 5 But Engel highlights another critique
in noting the lack of rights talk among his Thai interlocutors. He shows
that the liberal assumptions that Western scholars possess about rights
discourses, or even rights consciousness, may themselves be sites
worthy of critical examination. During the same time that critiques of
rights were emerging in Western contexts, post-colonial scholars noted
certain problems with rights discourse in newly independent states
where the very discourse formerly used to justify colonialism was then
used to support the cause of individual freedom and independence.6
Immanuel Wallerstein highlighted the clear contradictions embedded in
rights discourse, especially in the discourse of international human
rights. 7
Scholars of human rights sharpened these critiques with more
nuanced studies of broad meanings and political implications of
international human rights advocacy. In her analysis of the debate in
anthropological circles over support for the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, Karen Engle notes the possible limitations of rights.8
Mark Goodale argues for a critical, anthropological approach to human
rights, by engaging with rights as a domain of knowledge production
and moral practice globally.9 In that vein, anthropologist Harri Englund
showed that human rights activists' use of discourses of freedom and
rights helped spread neoliberal governance, and further entrenched
both social and structural inequality. ' 0 Additionally, Mark Mazower and
5. See, e.g., MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE
POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994).
6. John Comaroff, The Discourse of Rights in Colonial South Africa: Subjectivity,
Sovereignty, Modernity, in IDENTITIES, POLITICS, AND RIGHTS 193-236 (Austin Sarat &
Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1995).
7. See generally Immanuel Wallerstein, The Insurmountable Contradictions of Liberalism:
Human Rights and the Rights of Peoples in the Geoculture of the Modern World-System, 94 S.
ATLANTIC Q. 1161 (1995).
8. See Karen Engle, From Skepticism to Embrace: Human Rights and the American
Anthropological Association from 1947-1999, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 536, 536-37 (2001).
9. See Mark Goodale, Introduction to HUMAN RIGHTS: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL READER
1, 1-19 (Mark Goodale, ed., 2009).
10. See generally HARRI ENGLUND, PRISONERS OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
AFRICAN POOR (2006).
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Sam Moyn brought deepened critical understandings of human rights
by shedding light on the broader historical considerations that existed
at the time of the Declaration's drafting." For Moyn, it was the Cold
War, and for Mazower, it was the legacy of the failure of the League of
Nations and the inability to protect minority, as opposed to individual,
rights. 12
Indeed Engel's vivid portrayal of the Thai village and of its
engagement-or lack thereof-with the CRC and rights discourses more
broadly calls into question the decontextualized and depoliticized notion
of rights-based interventionism currently being celebrated among some
legal scholars and rights activists as "humanity's law."'13 In non-
Western, post-imperialist contexts such "humanitarianism" may appear
simply as a form of neo-colonial liberalism with a twenty-first century
imprint to a cross-section of inhabitants of these so-called liberated
spaces.
II. POLITICS OF RIGHTS: FROM THE TOP DOWN
The liberal language of rights presupposes societies with atomized,
individuated contractors free to make deals, and configures a neutral,
representative, and centralized government that will verify, correct, and
enforce those contracts optimally made by parties with equal bargaining
power. As such, in some non-Western contexts, rights discourses are
potentially tainted by the adverse social implications of individualism.
As Engel points out, however, this possible stigma does not necessarily
mean that the ideas communicated in the CRC poster in Chiangmai are
not transmitted. 14 It is likely that such ideas have comparisons or
equivalencies that can be expressed locally, but with the imprint of the
specific rights discourse, indigenous traditions are also forever changed.
As others have already pointed out, rights are intersubjective. 15 They
take on forms that make sense in local contexts, and they give new
meaning to local avenues of making claims or seeking redress.
Citing Sally Merry's notion of "vernacularization," Engel concurs
with the point that norms presented in documents like the CRC may
11. See generally Mark Mazower, The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933-1950,
47 HIST. J. 379, 379-98 (2004); SAM MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY
44-83 (2010).
12. Mazower argues that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was actually a
step back from the more powerful vision of minority rights presented in the Covenant of
the League of Nations. See generally Mazower, supra note 11.
13. See, e.g., RUTI G. TEITEL, HUMANITY's LAW (2011).
14. Engel, supra note 1, at 441.
15. Ann-Belinda S. Preis, Human Rights as Cultural Practice: An Anthropological Critique,
18 HuM. RTs. Q. 286, 290 (1996).
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indeed develop their own localized meaning and authority, especially
among the elites who use them. 16 The issue for Engel, however, is
whether these frameworks for understanding will allow scholars to
break through from the rights consciousness of elites to the on-the-
ground effects of rights activism on the consciousness of "ordinary"
people. One point that needs further clarification and exploration,
however, is Engel's definition of ordinary people. Although starting from
different disciplinary concerns, Seyla Benhabib invokes liberal political
theories to make a point similar to Merry's. While disputing the charge
that the discourse of human rights is the tool of neo-colonial
interventionism, Benhabib also appears to claim that it is the ordinary
people who begin to employ rights discursively. 17  Benhabib
distinguishes between a concept (such as fairness or equality) and its
conception, which is framed through a broader set of moral and political
principles. She observes that transnational human rights norms possess
concepts (such as the right to life and liberty) that are important for
their normative conceptualizations in local contexts. For Benhabib, this
localization occurs through the "jurisgenerative effect" of law and
human rights.18 By "jurisgenerativity," Benhabib refers to "the law's
capacity to create a normative universe of meaning that can often
escape the 'provenance of formal lawmaking' to expand the meaning and
reach of law itself."19 Her claim is that one of the "jurisgenerative"
effects of human rights treaties is that they allow new actors-
minorities-"to enter the public sphere, to develop new vocabularies of
public claimmaking, and to anticipate new forms of justice to come."20
The new forms of justice emerge through processes she calls "democratic
iterations," or the "complex processes by which public argument,
deliberation, and exchange" take place on the ground; it is through
these processes that human rights claims are "contested and
contextualized" and then transformed, but with the transnational
normative concept in place.21 The jurisgenerative power of rights, then,
permits new actors to enter fields of contestation and fosters new
vocabularies of claim-making in sites that are themselves changing. It
remains to be seen whether Benhabib's new actors are similarly
situated, relative to Engel's ordinary people.
16. Engel, supra note 1, at 447.
17. See SEYLA BENHABIB, DIGNITY IN ADVERSITY: HUMAN RIGHTS IN TROUBLED TIMES
118 (2011).
18. Id. at 15.
19. Id. (referencing "jurisgenerativity" as a term coined in Robert M. Cover, The
Supreme Court 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1983)).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 129.
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III. RIGHTS DISCOURSES IN SHIFTING POLITICAL AND SOCIAL TERRAIN:
FROM THE BOTTOM UP
Individuals themselves are ever-changing, as Engel indicates, but so
too are the political landscapes of rights. 22 This is where the vertical
approach to rights consciousness can be supplemented with the
horizontal approach. But through the story of Buajan, Engel goes
beyond a mere context-based horizontal approach.23 His approach is a
long-term longitudinal study that allows him to take into consideration
the political and social shifts over time and to account for how they
affect vernacularization or jurisgenerativity of rights. Engel's
description of Buajan's story of injury and recovery changed after his
return to meet her ten years later and captures elements of rights
consciousness that cannot be measured otherwise. He shows that rights
consciousness emerges in a mobile field of changing political, economic,
social, and ethical contexts that must also be integrated into the
discussion. 24 A political climate that once saw rights as the appropriate
measure of state and social relations may now have shifted to a
different view. In this context, rights may carry a different meaning in
post-coup Thailand. This is the case in my own area of research:
women's rights in Iran.
Throughout the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the Iran-Iraq war, and the
post-revolutionary state's domestic and foreign relations, one discourse
framed the Islamic Republic's broader discursive modes: anti-
imperialism. Conservative revolutionaries argued that the imperialist
aims of would-be colonial states included the propagation of a rights
consciousness that had led women, among others, to see themselves as
individuals apart from the family and broader social relations. Social
relations were severed when the individual possessed an independent
relationship to the state; this is what a purely rights-based society
offered. With their relationship to the state unmediated by other social
relations, individuals would no longer owe reciprocal duties to family
members or to other networks of social relations. Conservatives argued
that this would lead to the deterioration of the social moral order. Thus,
the revolutionary aim of improving society through the rehabilitation of
women was part of the anti-imperialist tone of the revolution. It
situated women's roles and status as central to post-revolutionary state-
building processes. The focus was on relational identity, of women as
mothers, wives, sisters, and daughters, as opposed to individuals with
rights to use as claims against and protections from states.
22. See Engel, supra note 1, at 426.
23. Id. at 439-42.
24. Id.
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While this agenda initially unified many revolutionaries and
eventual leaders, it also engendered subsequent compromises to
improve women's lives. These compromises have resulted in strategic
shifts in the language of the revolution, citizens' claims for equity and
redress, especially those of women, and even formations of the state.
In the ensuing years, Iran's blended Islamic and civil institutions
produced a new form of rights talk, now seemingly re-legitimated in the
post-revolutionary era, recognizing the twin pillars of the revolution:
Islam and republicanism. The period from 1997 to 2005, in particular,
motivated a vocal women's movement to seek redress for grievances in
the form of rights, but now a hybrid notion of rights informed by both
civil legality and Islamic principles. 25 Over the years, however, activists'
emphasis on rights has been plagued by setbacks, and has fueled a
backlash which culminated in the 2009 clashes with state forces over
suspected irregularities in the presidential elections held in June of that
year.
Thus, in Iran today, we see a shift away from rights talk that was
reintegrated into the public discourse of citizenship and entitlement
from late 1990s to early 2000s, what some today refer to as the "reform
period." Inasmuch as the former president Khatami supported legal
consciousness, his adversaries criticized and moved away from this
language to a language of status. 26 Status, in the Iranian context once
again emphasizes relational identities-mother, wife, daughter, or
sister--over individualistic ones.
Here, it may also be productive to consider the nature of the dispute,
the limits of certain forms of dispute resolution, and the kinds of
complainants that various disputes and methods of resolution produce.
Of course when rights are championed, whether they are women's or
children's rights, they can be appealing to individuals, but they also
alienate these individuals from group membership, in family and other
social networks. Some kinds of disputes may be more favorably disposed
to nonadversarial reconciliation efforts. In family disputes, as opposed
to other, formal, civil disputes, such as those involving employment
discrimination, the adversarial method may not provide the most
fruitful manner of adjudication. 27 In these contexts, material concerns
may be negotiated in different processes, drawing not only from
25. See generally ARZOO OSANLOo, THE POLITICS OF WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN IRAN (2009).
26. See generally Arzoo Osanloo, What a Focus on 'Family' Means in Iran's
Contemporary Political Discourse, in ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW IN MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH
AFRICA 51 (Maaike Voorhoeve ed., 2012).
27. In Iran, parties to a divorce action are now required to enter mediation prior to an
adversarial hearing in family court. Iranian Family Protection Act, Article 26 (amended
August 2011).
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contract, but also perhaps, social and relational obligations. The women
I interviewed in Iran who were in troubled family relationships often
appealed simultaneously to legal remedies and also to affective
possibilities, such as conscience (vojhdan). "How can your conscience
permit you to do this?" one interlocutor exclaimed to her husband when
he refused to meet her demands for economic support. 28 Affective
appeals and binding legal remedies are often layered upon one another
in such situations. The sterile scenario of two adversarial parties on
opposite sides of a courtroom rarely hold true for disputing parties
anywhere in the world, as Engel also points out.29
Tightly woven and concentrated social arrangements may both show
the limits of rights discourses in some conflicts and provide different
forms of resolution. These social arrangements, once unraveled, may
also reveal limits of a uniquely rights-based approach.
The term "rights" itself carries different meanings for Iranian
women in different political settings (the revolution, war with Iraq),
personal settings (marriage, divorce), and spatial settings (moving to
and from work). Thus, I endeavored to understand rights-practices and
claims through their discursive contexts by investigating the dialogical
sites, or spaces, in which the discursive object (in this case, women's
rights or human rights) had meaning for the individuals who took up
the term. By tracing discussions of law taking place within these sites, I
sought to uncover the political connections between governance and
rights. Tracing these connections in the post-revolutionary era allowed
me to argue that knowledge about rights in Iran is dynamic,
intersubjective, and relational, while it is also politicized by state
institutions.
The issues being litigated, moreover, may not be remedied by rights
claims and court orders, even despite judicial decrees. Taking again the
example of women in marriage or familial disputes, through my
research, I learned that it is not the case that women do not employ
rights discourses, but rather that they use a hybrid discourse to make
claims that situate the individual both in relation to the state and also
within an array of social relations-what I have suggested elsewhere as
being "Islamico-civil" rights talk.30
28. In fact, in this context, women have limited legal remedies for maintenance after
divorce and a broad appeal to conscience is among an array of tools women use to gain
remedies where rights may be absent or ineffectual. See Iranian Civil Code on Marriage
and Divorce, Book 7, Chapter 8, Section 2, Articles 1120 - 1157.
29. Engel, supra note 1, at 429.
30. See generally Arzoo Osanloo, Islamico-Civil '"Rights Talk" Women, Subjectivity and
Law in Iranian Family Court, 33 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 191, 191-209 (2006) (referring to
Islamico-civil rights talk, which is the hybrid nature of law and legal discourse in Iran
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Others may avoid making use of the courts even when they are
available because the move to an official judicial arena could damage
certain familial relationships that may be far more productive and
fulfilling than obtaining a divorce order from a judge and going to live
alone in a single-unit apartment somewhere in the city. Living apart
from social networks could render oneself socially mute and invisible,
resulting in a sort of self-banishment.
Perhaps this is the time to reappraise Sir Henry Maine's
evolutionist assumptions about society's movement from status to
contract.31 Rather, it is time to consider a new space for status claims to
emerge in an increasingly interdependent world where states do not
offer all the services and protections that groups and individuals need.
For, despite Maine's predictions to the contrary, the state and
contractual relations do not always triumph over kinship relations and
status.
IV. SUBJECTIVITY AND RIGHTS
Another fruitful way of appraising this venue for rights may involve
looking beyond or more deeply than the conscious or unconscious appeal
to rights, and instead considering an embodied practice of social
interaction by examining subjectivity. While Engel mentions
subjectivity in a quote from Sally Merry,32 it appears that he is using it
interchangeably with consciousness. Perhaps there is some useful
purpose served in distinguishing the two.
By subjectivity, what I refer to is the formation of the self through
the social, economic, and political conditions that make it possible. As
Engel's Article moves away from the static construction of rights
consciousness and is careful to note its contingency and temporality
over time, I wonder, then, if what he is describing is not something
closer to what Biehl, Goode, and Kleinman refer to as "inner life
processes and affective states," part of their description of subjectivity in
their essay in a recent book on the subject.33
In my own work, I have referred to subjectivity as the production of
the self.34 In order to examine subjectivity, I needed to be aware of, and
today, drawing both from the domain of republican liberal formalism and Islamic
principles).
31. See generally HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (Peter Smith ed., 1970) (1861).
32. Engel, supra note 1, at 447.
33. Jodo Biehl, Byron Goode & Arthur Kleinman, Introduction: Rethinking Subjectivity, in
SUBJECTIVITY: ETHNOGRAPHIC INVESTIGATION 1, 6 (Jodo Biehl, Byron Goode & Arthur
Kleinman eds., 2007).
34. Osanloo, supra note 30, at 204, note 14.
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understand thoroughly, both Iranian women's sense of self and the
ideological conditions that make self-formations and expressions
possible in the Islamic Republic today. In order to do that, I explored the
sites of rights production as among the hegemonic sites that required
historical analysis. Family courts were among the sites visited. During
this process, I was able to engage with the relational subject who
emerges through and in concert with numerous and uneven conditions
on the ground. This made it possible for me to see that rights talk was
itself contingent in the sense that certain sites were amenable to claim
making in terms of rights, while others were not.
35
A focus on subjectivity or subject-making allowed me to conduct a
more subtle study of self-making through rights talk, because while
rights are communicated, they are also learned and expressed through
fields of power relations, and they become part of a mindset and daily
discipline that transcends language claims and court filings.
CONCLUSION
David Engel's thought-provoking Article raises many interesting
issues through a seemingly humble, but somewhat loaded, question. We
learn that rights consciousness may not be the only reserve of redress
for ordinary people in a small village. Rights carry with them meanings
that, when expressed, may transform those rights into context-bound
claims which may not always serve the needs of the interested partie's.
Sometimes, especially in small communities with deeply-embedded
social relations, broader needs such as reconciliation overtake
individual compensation, which is the kind of claim served by
individuated rights talk in many contexts. Here, Engel has revealed two
key points about redress: first, that ethics and peace of mind, as in
Buajan's need for forgiveness and reconciliation, are better served by
communal relationship-building as opposed to individual claim making;
and second, to capture such nuances in dispute resolution, it is
necessary to employ multiple research methods, the vertical and
horizontal approaches, while taking a long view of the road upon which
interlocutors journey toward their rights. This methodology enables the
researcher to account for, highlight, and explain the twists and turns on
their many avenues to restitution and remedy.
35. See OSANLOO, supra note 25.

